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THE DUTY TO PRESERVE ESI 
 (ITS TRIGGER, SCOPE, AND LIMIT) 
& THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE  
IN MARYLAND STATE COURTS 
 




nder the ancient doctrine omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatem, “[a]ll 
things are presumed against the spoliator.”2  That inference “rests upon a 
logical proposition that one would ordinarily not destroy evidence favorable 
to him [or her] self.”3  The corollary is that a person will preserve that which 
is beneficial to his or her case.4 
     The spoliation doctrine can be traced back to the 1722 English case of 
Armory v. Delamirie.5  American courts began addressing spoliation in 1794;6 
however, in modern times the doctrine has become more nuanced and complex 
than a mere Latin phrase.  It is particularly important in the area of 
                                                                                                                             
1 The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and not of any 
organization with which he is affiliated.  Mr. Berman is a partner at Rifkin, Weiner, 
Livingston, Levitan & Silver, LLC.  He recently co-authored Referenda in 
Maryland: The Need for Comprehensive Statutory Reform, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 655 
(2013); co-edited MANAGING E-DISCOVERY AND ESI: FROM PRE-LITIGATION 
THROUGH TRIAL (Michael D. Berman, et al., eds., ABA 2011) [hereinafter 
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY]; and co-authored Proportionality in the Post-Hoc 
Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381 (2008), 
and Discovery About Discovery: Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect All 
Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially 
Relevant Information?, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 413 (2008).  He is an adjunct professor 
at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where he teaches an electronic 
discovery workshop.   
2 Cecil Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Russell, 159 Md. App. 594, 618, 861 A.2d 92, 
106 (2004); see also Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 214, 494 A.2d 
761, 768 (1985). 
3 Russell, 159 Md. App. at 618, 861 A.2d at 106; see also Miller, 64 Md. App. at 
214, 494 A.2d at 768. 
4 Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 562, 694 A.2d 150, 156 (1997). 
5 Armory v. Delamarie, Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722), described in MANAGING E-
DISCOVERY, supra note 1. 
6 MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 751 n.12 (citing Bd. of Justices v. 
Fennimore, 1 N.J.L., 1794 WL 507 (N.J. 1794)); see also M. KOESEL AND T. 
TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, at xv n.3 (ABA 3d ed. 2013) (referring to the 
1800’s). 
U    
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electronically stored information (“ESI”) because of the unique characteristics 
of that medium. 
     ESI, and its component and related metadata, is easily destroyed or altered.  
Frequently, such metadata is either irrelevant or unimportant; however, often 
it has substantive relevance and, almost invariably, it is valuable when ESI is 
loaded into software for litigation review.  Further, changes to metadata may 
call the authenticity of files and their contents into question.7 
     Metadata may be changed through mere inattention, human error, or 
negligence.  For example, opening an electronic document will likely alter the 
“date accessed” metadata.  Copying it will likely change the “date created.”  
Routine software or hardware upgrades may alter metadata without 
malevolent intent.  Scheduled operation of a defragmentation program, which 
is commonly provided with computer operating systems to increase efficiency, 
may overwrite data.8 
     Sometimes, however, the changes are not inadvertent.  Freeware may be 
used to intentionally change a file’s attributes.9  Additionally, modern word 
processing software often includes metadata “scrubbers” that are capable of 
removing information stored with the electronic document.10 
     Paradoxically, it is sometimes difficult to destroy ESI, even with 
malevolent intent.11  Although it is fragile, ESI is also persistent—it is often 
stored in multiple locations and forms.  For example, in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg, LLC, Ms. Zubulake proved spoliation because she had printed 
                                                                                                                             
7 One “way in which electronic evidence may be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4) 
is by examining the metadata for the evidence.”  Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 
241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) (referring to Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)); see also 
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 532 (D. Md. 2010). 
8 In the current version of Microsoft Windows, a search for “defragmentation” will 
open the Disk Defragmenter, which may be run on command or on a periodic basis. 
What is Disk Defragmentation?, WINDOWS.MICROSOFT.COM, 
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/what-is-disk-
defragmentation#1TC=windows-7 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).  
9 For example, “Attribute Changer 7.11” advertises that it can change a file’s date 
and time stamps. FILEHIPPO,   http://filehippo.com/download_attributechanger (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2015).  “If you just want to replace the item’s stored time stamp 
information with the current time frame, you can quickly do that by using the pop-up 
menu. It allows you to do that for selected fields only or for all the fields in one 
click.” SOFTPEDIA,   http://www.softpedia.com/get/System/File-
Management/Attribute-Changer.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).  
10 J. SAMMONS, THE BASICS OF DIGITAL FORENSICS 74 fig. 5.3 (Syngress 2012).  For 
example, in the recent version of Microsoft Word, clicking on the “File” tab will 
lead to an icon to “check for issues.”  That icon will permit the user to locate, and 
remove, possibly hidden data from the document. 
11 Describing a failed attempt to destroy ESI, The Honorable Paul W. Grimm wrote: 
“At the end of the day, this is the case of the ‘gang that couldn’t spoliate straight.’”  
Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 501. 
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copies of emails that UBS Warburg failed to produce.12  Additionally, deleted 
data may be forensically recoverable.  Even “wiping” software that is designed 
to overwrite data may leave tell-tale traces of erasure in a computer’s registry 
file.13 
     Spoliation may be considered the flip side of the duty to preserve 
potentially responsive information.  If there is no duty to preserve information, 
destruction or loss of it cannot be spoliation.14  Both are common law doctrines 
that have received attention in countless federal decisions, and they are the 
subject of a pending proposal to revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 
     In light of the January 2008 ESI amendments to the Maryland Rules, the 
body of federal law, the common law and ethical requirements16 governing 
preservation of potentially discoverable information and evidence, and several 
                                                                                                                             
12 217 F.R.D. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In fact, Zubulake knew that there were 
additional responsive e-mails that UBS had failed to produce because she herself had 
produced approximately 450 pages of [printed] e-mail correspondence.”) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
13 Craig Ball, Musings on Electronic Discovery, pp. 110, 201 (2008), available at 
http://www.craigball.com/BIYC.pdf. 
14 In Columbia Town Center Title Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland made clear that destruction that occurs before the duty to 
preserve is triggered is not spoliation: “[T]his is not a spoliation case.  The files were 
destroyed before appellants knew there was a title problem.” Columbia Town Ctr. 
Title Co. v. 100 Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 203 Md. App. 61, 83, 36 A.3d 985, 988 n.6 (2012), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 430 Md. 197, 80 A.3d 1 (2013); accord First Mariner 
Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV. MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550, at *8-9 
(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014). 
15 See e.g., Charles S. Fax, Less Is More: Proposed Rule 37(e) Strikes the Right 
Balance, LITIG. NEWS, Summer 2014, at 18, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/summer1
4.pdf; Charles S. Fax, Proposed Changes to Federal Rules Prompt Pushback, LITIG. 
NEWS, Spring 2014, at 18, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/spring14.
pdf; Charles S. Fax, Big Changes on the Horizon for Federal Rules, LITIG. NEWS, 
Winter 2014, at 20, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_news/winter14.
pdf. See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to Preserve: Best 
Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in MANAGING E-
DISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8. 
16 For a discussion of ethical issues in connection with ESI, see generally Md. R. 
Prof. Conduct 3.4(a) (lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter or destroy material with potential evidentiary value”); 
Dennis P. Duffy & Courtney I. Barton, Ethics in E-Discovery, in MANAGING E-
DISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 29; PAUL W. GRIMM & LISA M. YURWIT, 
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION IN MARYLAND AND FEDERAL COURTS: 
DISCOVERY, ADMISSIBILITY AND ETHICS Ch. 7 (MICPEL 2008); JOHN M. BARKETT, 
THE ETHICS OF E-DISCOVERY (ABA 2009). 
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Maryland decisions involving ESI,17 Maryland courts and practitioners should 
consider the development of the duty to preserve and the spoliation doctrine 
in Maryland courts.18 
 
II. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 
 
There are several salient concepts.  First, when is the common law duty to 
preserve triggered?  Second, what is its scope and what are its limits?  Third, 
if the duty to preserve is breached, what degree of culpability and prejudice 
will support what type of sanction?  The answers are deceptively simple. 
     The duty is triggered when litigation is reasonably anticipated.  It extends 
to potentially responsive information.  It is limited by concepts of 
proportionality and reasonableness; perfection is not required.  When 
breached, there may be a need to level the playing field.  That may implicate 
a wide range of sanctions based on a fact-sensitive inquiry.19 
     Many Maryland appellate courts have relied on the four-step analysis of 
White v. Office of the Public Defender, a 1997 federal decision.20  A persuasive 
body of recent case law suggests that spoliation decisions should be made 
using what is essentially a three-step analysis: (1) Was the duty to preserve 
breached?—(a) Was the duty triggered?  (b) If so, what is the scope of the 
duty?  (c) What are the limits on the scope of the duty?—(2) Was there a 
sufficiently culpable state of mind?  (3) If the innocent party was prejudiced, 
what sanction, if any, is appropriate? 
     This article will examine the duty to preserve in Section III. Then, Section 
IV will define spoliation. Sections V through VIII will explain the state of the 
Maryland spoliation doctrine, providing analysis under both the Maryland 
Rules and decisions of Maryland courts. Section IX will then suggest a three-
step analysis for approaching spoliation issues. Finally, the article will end on 





                                                                                                                             
17 E.g., Sublet v. State, 2015 WL 1826582 (Md. Apr. 23, 2015) (authentication of 
text messages). 
18 “[O]pting out by seeking refuge in the state court system is no longer an option.” 
J. Mark Coulson, Maryland Courts No Longer Safe Haven for E-Discovery 
Resistors, 43 MD. BAR J. 32, 35 (2010).  
19 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: 
The Trigger & The Process, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 269 (2010) [hereinafter 
Sedona Conference Commentary]. 
20 City Homes v. Hazelwood, 210 Md. App. 615, 670, 63A.3d 713, 746 (2013), cert. 
denied, 432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013), citing Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 
179, 194-97, 728 A.2d 727, cert. denied, 355 Md. 612, 735 A.2d 1107 (1999), both 
in turn citing White v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 170 F.R.D. 138 (D. Md. 1997). 
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III. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE: ITS TRIGGER, SCOPE, AND LIMITS 
 
A. The Common Law Duty to Preserve is Triggered by the Reasonable 
Anticipation of Litigation 
 
     As a general principle, “[u]nless otherwise required by law, no individual 
or entity is required to preserve records.”21  The common law duty to preserve 
is triggered when litigation becomes reasonably anticipated.22  Sedona 
Conference Guideline 1 states that there is reasonable anticipation when there 
is a credible probability that an organization will become involved in 
litigation.23  Guideline 4 suggests that this an objective determination to be 
made in good faith after a reasonable evaluation.24  There is no one-size-fits-
all checklist.25 
 
B. The Scope of the Duty Encompasses Potentially Responsive 
Information 
 
     Determining the scope of the duty to preserve has been described as one of 
the most vexing issues in e-discovery.26  As noted by The Honorable Shira A. 
Scheindlin, while the duty’s “broad contours” are “relatively clear,” the 
obligation “cannot be defined with precision.”27 
                                                                                                                             
21 PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (ABA 2d ed. 2008). 
For additional detail, see Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc 
Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 388 
n.27 (2008) [hereinafter Grimm et al., Proportionality]. As with any general rule, 
there are a number of exceptions. See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 
F.2d 1104 (8th Cir) (remanding for factual determination of whether facially neutral 
destruction policy was an artifice to evade duty to preserve information about 
alleged unsafe firearm). 
22 For a discussion of the multiple sources of the duty other than common law, see 
Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 388-39. The discussion in this article 
is limited to the common law duty to preserve. 
23 Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 19, at 269. Publications of the 
Sedona Conference are cited extensively in comments to the January 2008 
amendments to the Maryland Rules.  A prior iteration of the Sedona Commentary 
required a credible “threat,” and that reference has properly been removed. 
24 Id. at 270. 
25 Id. at 271 (providing concrete examples of fact patterns that would, or would not, 
trigger the duty). 
26 Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 385 (quotation to Kenneth Withers 
omitted). 
27 Id. at 392-93 (citing to Scheindlin, J.). 
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     The duty has been described as a duty to preserve “potentially relevant 
evidence.”28  Thus, it has been linked to the scope of discovery.29  While that 
is a helpful rule of thumb, it is often too narrow because information that need 
not be produced in discovery may be subject to the duty to preserve.  To 
provide one example, a backup tape may be subject to the duty to preserve but, 
because it may be costly to restore, may not be subject to the duty to produce.30  
Further, because the parameters of discovery are often unclear, defining the 
scope of the duty to preserve in terms of the scope of discovery may be of little 
practical assistance.31  This dilemma may lead a potential litigant to over-
preserve, unreasonably increasing the cost of litigation.32 
 
C. Proportionality Limits the Scope of the Duty 
 
     It is axiomatic that the law should not compel a litigant to spend $50,000 
preserving information for a $5,000 case.33  That axiom illustrates the principle 
of proportionality.  In the discovery context, it is embodied in the cost-benefit 
analysis of Maryland Rule 2-402(b).34 
                                                                                                                             
28 Id. at 396 (quoting Paul Rice) (internal quotations omitted).  Restricting the duty 
to “evidence” may be too narrow. 
29 Id. at 385, 396 (citation omitted).     
30 Two conceptual examples, among others, may be found in Maryland Rules 2-
402(b)(1) and 2-402(b)(2).  Under Rule 2-402(b)(2) information that is not readily 
accessible due to undue burden or cost may not need to be produced in discovery, 
yet it may be subject to the duty to preserve.  Similarly, information that need not be 
produced under the cost-benefit test of Rule 2-402(b)(1) may still be subject to the 
duty to preserve.   
31 Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 397. 
32 Id. at 403, 407, 411. 
33 Id. at 407-11; accord Theodore Hirt, Applying "Proportionality" Principles in 
Electronic Discovery – Lessons for Federal Agencies and Their Litigators, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ BULL., May 2011, at 46-47, available at 
http://justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5903.pdf. 
34 Maryland Rule 2-402(b) provides: 
 
The court shall limit the frequency or extent of use of the 
discovery methods otherwise permitted under these rules if it 
determines that (A) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative or is obtainable from some other source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (B) 
the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (C) the 
burden or cost of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit, taking into account the complexity of the case, the amount 
in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed 
discovery in resolving the issues. 
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     It has been suggested that proportionality and cost-benefit analysis provide 
the best tools for analyzing and limiting the scope of the duty to preserve.35  
For example, Sedona Conference Guideline 6 suggests that the duty to 
preserve be “applied proportionately.”36  A corollary is that perfection is not 
required; reasonable efforts are.37  When information that should have been 
preserved is not, the failure may present an issue of spoliation. 
 
IV. DEFINITION OF SPOLIATION 
 
     Spoliation has been described as a word with “evil connotations.”38  In 
Keyes v. Hereman, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland defined 
spoliation as the intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment 
of evidence, usually a document.39  In Cost v. State, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland wrote that the “term ‘spoliation,’ moreover, is often associated with 
egregious or bad faith actions, and not for cases involving negligent 
destruction or loss.”40 
                                                                                                                             
35 Grimm et al., Proportionality, supra note 21, at 405. See Mancia v. Mayflower 
Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008), and Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian 
Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35 (D. Md. 2000), for examples of cases applying 
proportionality analysis. 
36 Sedona Conference Commentary, supra note 19, at 270. 
37 See, e.g., Michael D. Berman, What Does “The Making of a Surgeon” Have to Do 
With ESI and “Software Glitches?”, MICHAEL D. BERMAN BLOG (July 15, 2011), 
http://www.esi-mediation.com/what-does-%e2%80%9cthe-making-of-a-
surgeon%e2%80%9d-have-to-do-with-esi-and-software-glitches/ (demonstrating 
that perfection is not, and never has been, the applicable standard in evaluating ESI 
issues). Similarly, Sedona Principle 5 provides for “reasonable and good faith” 
efforts to preserve, and states that “it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every 
conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant electronically stored 
information.”  THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DATABASE 
PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF DATABASES AND 




38 MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, xvi 
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., ABA 3d ed. 2013) (quoting United Med. Supply Co. v. U.S., 
77 Fed. Cl. 257, 276 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
39 Keyes v. Lerman, 191 Md. App. 533, 537, 992 A.2d 519, 522 (2010) (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th  ed. 2004)). 
40 Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 369, 10 A.3d 184, 190 (2010). 
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     Other definitions do not include the word “intentional,”41 and some courts 
have found spoliation based on negligence.42  The Sedona Conference glossary 
states: “Spoliation is the destruction of records or properties, such as metadata, 
that may be relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation, government 
investigation or audit.”43  The Sedona Conference has also suggested that in 
order for there to be spoliation, there must be a “knowing violation of an 
established duty” or “a reckless disregard amounting to gross negligence.”44 
     The spoliation doctrine has been variously recognized as an independent 
tort, a defense to recovery, an evidentiary inference or presumption, a 
discovery sanction, a substantive rule of law, and a rule of evidence or 
procedure.45  Spoliation is not an independent tort in Maryland.46 
     Colloquially, one person’s trash is another person’s treasure.47  One ESI 
decision suggested: 
 
Aside perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten the 
integrity of the judicial process more than the spoliation of 
evidence. Our adversarial process is designed to tolerate 
human failings—erring judges can be reversed, uncooperative 
counsel can be shepherded, and recalcitrant witnesses 
compelled to testify. But, when critical documents go 
missing, judges and litigants alike descend into a world of ad 
                                                                                                                             
41 Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 214, 494 A.2d 761, 767-68 
(1985). See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to Preserve: Best 
Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in MANAGING E-
DISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8, at 234. 
42 See generally Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 542-53 
(D. Md. 2010) (for a chart of the varying culpability standards in federal courts 
across the nations). 
43 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E–DISCOVERY 
& DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 48 (2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/misc Files/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf, 
quoted in Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 516. 
44 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION, BEST 
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 70 (2d ed. June 2007), available at 
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/privat
e/drupal/filesys/publications/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf. 
45 Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 198, 728 A.2d 727, 736 (1999). 
46 See Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894 (2006); 
Md. Jockey Club of Balt. City, Inc. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2364, 2002 WL 
32123994 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 17, 2002); Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. 
App. 202, 494 A.2d 761 (1985); Peamon v. H&S Bakery, Inc., et al., No. 8-487, 
2008 WL 6843228 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. July 17, 2008). 
47 United Med. Supply Co. v. U.S., 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258 (2007). 
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hocery and half measures—and our civil justice system 
suffers.48 
 
V. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE UNDER THE MARYLAND RULES 
 
     The Maryland Rules were amended as of January 1, 2008, to address 
electronic discovery.49  Maryland Rule 2-433(a) authorizes a court to impose 
such orders as are “just” in regard to a failure of discovery.50  It has been held 
to permit spoliation sanctions.51   
     Maryland Rule 2-433(b) provides a limited “safe harbor,” by precluding 
spoliation sanctions, “under these Rules,” if ESI “is no longer available as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operations of an electronic information 
system,” except under exceptional circumstances.52  The limits of the 
protection afforded by Maryland Rule 2-433(b) have been authoritatively 
well-described elsewhere.53  As noted therein, the protection does not apply if 
there are exceptional circumstances, a term that is not defined.  Further it 
applies only to routine, good faith losses.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, “the limitation on the court's ability to sanction for the loss or 
destruction of ESI under amended Md. Rule 2-433(b) is to the imposition of 
sanctions ‘under this rule.’ The court still retains its inherent authority to 
impose sanctions for a failure to preserve, in appropriate circumstances.”54  
Thus, the Maryland Rule 2-433 “safe harbor” provides no protection from 
sanctions under sources of authority that are not based on the Maryland Rules, 
nor does it provide protection after litigation has become reasonably 
anticipated. 
                                                                                                                             
48 Id. at 258-59.  
49 J. Mark Coulson, Maryland Courts No Longer Safe Haven for E-Discovery 
Resistors, 43 MD. B. J. 32 (2010) (discussing a number of Maryland Rules that apply 
specifically to ESI). 
50 Md. Rule 2-433(a). 
51 Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 194, 728 A.2d 727, 734 (1999). 
52 See Md. Rule 2-433(b). 
53 GRIMM & YURWIT, supra note 16, ch. 1, at 1-20; see also Chambers v. NASCO, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) (discussing a court’s inherent powers); Klupt, 126 
Md. App. at 196-97, 728 A.2d at 735 (discussing inherent authority of the courts to 
regulate discovery). See generally Leslie Wharton & Stephanie Weirick, Duty to 
Preserve: Best Practices, Spoliation, Sanctions, and the Safe Harbor Provision, in 
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, ch. 8, at 235 n.45.   
54 GRIMM & YURWIT, supra note 16, at 8 (citing Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 
175 Md. App. 16, 923 A.2d 1032, cert. denied, 401 Md. 174, 931 A.2d 1097 (2007) 
(recognizing the trial court's inherent authority to impose sanctions for spoliation of 
evidence that took place prior to the commencement of litigation and, hence, outside 
the reach of the rules of procedure); Klupt, 126 Md. App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 
(holding that the circuit court had inherent authority to impose sanctions for 
destruction of evidence)). 
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     Like the Federal Rules, the Maryland Rules do not specify when a 
spoliation motion must be filed.  Unlike their federal counterparts, Maryland 
courts have not addressed when a spoliation motion should or must be filed, 
or when it should be decided.55  Guideline 2 of the Proposed Revisions to the 
Discovery Guidelines of the Maryland State Bar suggests that attorneys 
propose milestone dates for spoliation motions.56 
 
VI. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 
 
A. Antecedents of the Modern Doctrine of Spoliation 
 
     Maryland courts have addressed spoliation since at least the 1880’s.  In an 
early spoliation case, Love v. Dilley, the decedent had left money to his 
beneficiaries, but advancements made to them during his life were to be 
deducted from the corpus so that equal shares would be left.57  Notes showing 
advancements to one group existed; notes to the other group were destroyed.58   
     In essence, the papers favorable to Barney Dilley and his group were 
preserved but those that were unfavorable had gone missing. The court 
determined that the loss was designed to prevent equitable distribution.59 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote: “There could be but one conceivable 
purpose in putting these papers out of the way. The spoliation, by whomsoever 
committed, was intended to promote the interest of Barney Dilley, the 
Edwards, and the Everetts, by relieving them from the necessity of bringing 
them into the hotchpot.”60 
     The court then addressed the remedy: 
 
It is our duty to prevent the contemplated injustice by all the 
legitimate means in our power. Exact justice is out of the 
question; it has been prevented by the destruction of the 
means of attaining it. We can, however, charge these 
[spoliating] parties with such sums as the evidence shows they 
                                                                                                                             
55 See, e.g., Michael D. Berman, Timing of Spoliation Motions: Goodman v. Praxair 
Services, Inc., in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, app. C (discussing the 
time at which a spoliation motion should or must be filed). 
56 MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE DISCOVERY 
GUIDELINES OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR, at 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.msba.org/uploadedFiles/ 
MSBA/Member_Groups/Sections/Litigation/GuidelinesDRAFT061214.pdf.  
57 Love v. Dilley, 64 Md. 238, 1 A. 59, 59-60 (1885), modified, 64 Md. 238, 4 A. 
290 (1886). 
58 Id. at 239, 1 A. at 59-60. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
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received from Joseph Dilley in his life-time, and require them 
to exonerate themselves by proper proof.61  
 
It reasoned that “the blame must rest on those who have destroyed or 
concealed the evidence . . . .”62  The court permitted the non-spoliating party 
to rely on secondary evidence: 
 
Of course, if [the decedent’s] notes and papers could be 
obtained, there could not be the least difficulty in ascertaining 
these different amounts, and in making a perfectly fair 
division of his property among his children. But as in some 
instances they have disappeared, we are of necessity obliged 
to rely upon the more uncertain and unsatisfactory evidence 
set forth in the record. It is morally impossible that our 
conclusions should be accurate. We at best can only hope to 
make an approximation to true results. But the blame must 
rest on those who have destroyed or concealed the evidence 
which would remove all obscurity on the subject; and when, 
from the want of this proof, we fall into errors, the loss will 
justly fall on those whose misconduct has destroyed the 
means of arriving at the truth.63   
 
     In an early application of the modern adverse inference doctrine, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland wrote in odium spoliatoris omnia præsumuntur.64  It 
explained: 
 
If a person is proved to have defaced or destroyed any written 
instrument, a presumption arises that if the truth had appeared 
it would have been against his interest, and that his conduct is 
attributable to his knowledge of this circumstance, and, 
accordingly, slight evidence of the contents of the instrument 
will usually, in such a case, be sufficient. In dealing with the 
difficulties of this case we have endeavored to draw from the 
competent evidence in the record only such conclusions as 





                                                                                                                             
61 Id. at 291, 1 A. at 64 (emphasis added).  
62 Id. at 239, 1 A. at 60.  
63 Love, 64 Md. at 239, 1 A. at 60. 
64 Id. at 246, 1 A. at 64 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
65 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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B. The Modern Doctrine of Spoliation 
 
     In Cost v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that “’spoliation’ 
is often used in civil cases, where parties withhold or destroy evidence 
strategically.”66  Cost was a criminal case; however, the court contrasted the 
civil spoliation doctrine with the criminal “missing evidence” analysis.67  Cost 
was convicted after allegedly stabbing a fellow inmate.  The State took certain 
physical evidence into custody and later discarded it.  The court held that it 
was error to refuse Cost’s request for a jury instruction: “Maryland recognizes 
some form of jury instructions regarding missing or destroyed evidence in both 
civil and the criminal contexts.  In the civil context, we give a jury instruction 
for the ‘spoliation of evidence’ where a party has destroyed or failed to 
produce evidence.”68 The court then quoted the pattern civil jury instruction: 
 
The destruction of or the failure to preserve evidence by a 
party may give rise to an inference unfavorable to that party.  
If you find that the intent was to conceal the evidence, the 
destruction or failure to preserve must be inferred to indicate 
that the party believes that his or her case is weak and that he 
or she would not prevail if the evidence was preserved.  If you 
find that the destruction or failure to preserve the evidence 
was negligent, you may, but are not required to, infer that the 
evidence, if preserved, would have been unfavorable to that 
party.69 
 
     The Cost court rested its analysis on the principle that “one does not 
ordinarily withhold evidence that is beneficial to one's case.”70  It emphasized 
that:  “The instruction does not require that a jury make an adverse inference 
in situations involving the spoliation of evidence; rather, it merely permits 
                                                                                                                             
66 Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 369, 10 A.3d 184, 190 (2010). 
67 This article addresses only civil cases.  In the criminal context, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has described the term “spoliation” as imprecise and 
misleading.  Cost, 417 Md. at 369, 10 A.3d at 190.  For some opinions addressing 
the doctrine in the criminal context, see Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 694-99, 741 
A.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1999) (due process); Butler v. State, 214 Md. App. 635, 662-
64, 78 A.3d 887, 903-04 (2013) (alleged unavailable witness); Hajireen v. State, 203 
Md. App. 537, 558-61, 39 A.3d 105, 118-20 (2012); Grymes v. State, 202 Md. App. 
70, 113-14, 30 A.3d 1032, 1057 (2011); and Tetso v. State, 205 Md. App. 334, 45 
A.3d 788 (2012). 
68 Cost, 427 Md. at 370, 369 A.3d at 190. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 370, 369 A.3d at 190 (quoting Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 
562, 694 A.2d 150, 156 (1997)). 
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such an inference.”71  The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained: “For the 
judicial system to function fairly, one party in a case cannot be permitted to 
gain an unfair advantage through the destruction of evidence.”72 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly stated that the spoliation 
doctrine does not provide substantive proof.73  Instead, the destruction of 
evidence after a duty to preserve has arisen raises an inference that the 
destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the spoliator.  Further, in the unique 
context of a spoliated will, the will’s contents may be proven by secondary 
                                                                                                                             
71 Id. at 370-71, 396 A.3d at 190-91 (explanatory footnote omitted) (citing Joseph F. 
Murphy, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 409 (4th ed. 2010) (“Destruction of 
evidence permits, but does not require, an inference that the evidence would have 
been unfavorable to the position of the party who destroyed the evidence.”)). 
72 Cost, 427 Md. at 381, 396 A.3d at 197. 
73 On the issue of substantive proof, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has written, 
“Even in evidence spoliation cases, the fact finder is not permitted to find the 
destruction of evidence to be substantive proof that the evidence was unfavorable.”  
Bereano v. State Ethics Comm’n, 403 Md. 716, 747, 944 A.2d 538, 556 (2008).  
“Although an inference arises from the suppression of evidence by a litigant that this 
evidence would be unfavorable to his cause, it is well settled that this inference does 
not amount to substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact 
necessary to the other party’s case.”  Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 Md. 346, 355, 129 
A.2d 109, 114 (1957) (citations omitted); accord Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 
228, 255 A.2d 387, 391 (1969) (“As a general rule, an inference arises from the 
suppression or destruction of evidence by a litigant that such evidence would be 
unfavorable to his case. However, this inference does not amount to substantive 
proof and can not take the place of proof of a fact necessary to the other party’s 
case.”) (citation omitted).  Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals has stated that:  
 
[A] presumption does not necessarily shift the burden of 
persuasion. Rather, it merely satisfies the burden of going forward 
on a fact presumed and may satisfy the burden of persuasion if no 
rebuttal evidence is introduced by the other side. When the 
responding party introduces rebutting evidence, the presumption 
often is sufficient to generate a jury question on the issue, despite 
the fact that the beneficiary of the presumption has not produced 
any other evidence on the subject. . . .  Stated differently, the party 
favored by the presumption is not relieved of the requirement of 
presenting evidence to establish a prima facie case as to those 
issues for which he bears the burden of proof if the adverse party 
sufficiently rebuts the presumption.   
 
Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 564, 694 A.2d 150, 157 (1997). 
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evidence,74 and the doctrine permits a presumption to supply the suppressed 
proof.75 
     In Hoffman v. Stamper, Hoffman (a defendant who was the appraiser in an 
alleged house-flipping scheme) destroyed documents “in direct violation of 
HUD and ethical requirements applicable to appraisers,” and “deliberately 
destroyed all of his notes once [alleged flipper] Beeman's activities came to 
public attention.”76 The destruction was spoliation and raised an inference that 
the destroyed documents were unfavorable to Hoffman: “From that spoliation 
alone the jury was entitled to infer that those notes would have been 
detrimental to Hoffman's defense, that they would not have supported what he 
said from the witness stand.”77 
     In Larsen v. Romeo, Romeo’s tractor-trailer rear-ended Larsen’s vehicle.78  
Romeo asserted that, in part, the incident was caused by sudden, unforeseeable 
failure of the truck’s air brakes.  After the collision, Romeo (or a mechanic)79 
took a piece of air hose from the tractor, observed a leak, and then threw it 
away.  Larsen asserted that spoliation provided proof that the air hose had not 
failed.  The court disagreed.  It stated the general rule that suppression or 
destruction of evidence supports an inference that the evidence would have 
been unfavorable to the spoliator.  It then stated that “this inference does not 
amount to substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact 
                                                                                                                             
74 For a discussion suggesting a greater role for secondary evidence in the sanctions 
analysis, see MICHAEL D. BERMAN & RACHEL A. SHAPIRO, The Secondary Evidence 
Rule in Avoidance of Spoliation Sanctions, in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 
1, ch. 10. 
75 The Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote, in the will context, that:  
 
[I]f necessary, the law will prevent the perpetration of a fraud by 
permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof. We 
cannot assent to the proposition that the statute is so rigid as to be 
the wrongdoer’s most effective weapon. The misconduct once 
established to the satisfaction of the jury, it is no hardship to the 
wrongdoer to say, ‘Produce the evidence in your possession, or we 
will presume that your opponent’s contention is true.’ When one 
deliberately destroys, or purposely induces another to destroy, a 
written instrument of any kind, and the contents of such instrument 
subsequently become a matter of judicial inquiry between the 
spoliator and an innocent party, the latter will not be required to 
make strict proof of the contents of such instrument in order to 
establish a right founded thereon.   
 
Preston v. Preston, 149 Md. 498, 132 A. 55, 61 (1926).   
76 Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 27, 867 A.2d 276, 292 (2005). 
77 Id., 867 A.2d at 292. 
78 Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969). 
79 It was not clear whether Romeo or a mechanic had removed the piece of hose.  
Romeo, 254 Md. at 224. 
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necessary to the other party.”  It concluded that, at most, the inference would 
show “that that particular piece of hose, which may or may not have been part 
of the brake system, was not defective.  Such an inference does not negate 
Romeo’s testimony that his brakes failed.”80 
     The Larsen court relied on Maszczenski v. Meyers, a decision in which a 
child was injured in a fall from a broken swing. 81  The defendant discarded a 
link from the chain that held the swing before the plaintiff could examine it.82  
The court noted no “statutory presumption here,” and wrote:  
 
Probably Mr. Myers should not have disposed of the link. 
There is of course no evidence here that he disposed of the 
link intentionally for the purpose of concealing the fact that it 
had opened. It could hardly be contended that throwing away 
the broken link was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
an inspection of the link before the accident would have 
revealed the latent defect.  
 
                                                                                                                             
80 In explaining Larsen, the Court of Appeals of Maryland wrote:  
  
     Both Larsen and DiLeo were cases in which one party 
destroyed potential evidence. Nonproduction of evidence does not 
automatically equate with destruction of evidence. Petitioner offers 
no evidence that the police purposely suppressed or destroyed the 
jacket. The record reveals that the police accurately reported the 
existence of the jacket during the inventory search of the vehicle. 
While the defendant may have considered the jacket to be relevant 
evidence, there is little evidence that the police considered it to be 
evidence, and ever held it as evidence. Larsen and DiLeo point to 
intent or motive behind the destruction as essential to the drawing 
of the inference. Therefore, those cases do not aid petitioner 
because, not only is there no evidence that the police destroyed the 
jacket, petitioner has not established what the police motive or 
intent behind destroying the jacket would be. 
 
Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d 1119, 1129 (1999) (citing Dileo v. 
Nugent, 88 Md. App. 59, 592 A.2d 1126 (1991), appeal dismissed, 327 Md. 627, 
612 A.2d 257 (1992); Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969)). 
81 Maszczenski v. Meyers, 212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109 (1957). 
82 The court wrote: 
  
The appellants in their brief admit: “It is true, as stated by the Court, that 
there was no evidence in the case to show that if an inspection was made 10 
minutes before it broke would have disclosed it was going to break.” 
However, they claim that this was because Mr. Myers threw away the 
broken link and they had no opportunity to examine it. 
 
Id. at 354, 129 A.2d at 113. 
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The court noted that, although an inference may arise from suppression, it was 
well-settled that the inference is not substantive proof.83 
 
VII. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 
 
     DiLeo v. Nugent was a medical malpractice action.84  A patient alleged that 
a therapist had participated in illicit drug use and had sexual contact with her.85  
He advised her to keep a journal and, during the nine month occurrence, the 
patient kept an 800-page journal.  She destroyed it, after consulting an 
attorney, because she feared that she would commit suicide and the journal 
would upset her family.86  The circuit judge instructed the jury that destruction 
of evidence gives rise to inferences unfavorable to the spoliator.  Not only was 
that instruction held to be proper, it was also held to be proper to refuse to 
instruct on destruction with fraudulent intent because the patient provided 
explanations for her failure to produce the journal.87 
     Miller v. Montgomery County, involved an auto tort.  One question was 
whether a minor movement controller component (“MM3”) had caused an 
                                                                                                                             
83 Id. at 355, 129 A.2d at 114. 
84 DiLeo v. Nugent, 88 Md. App. 59, 592 A.2d 1126 (1991), appeal dismissed, 327 
Md. 627, 612 A.2d 257 (1992). 
85 The therapist did not testify, and the court gave a “missing witness” instruction.  
The court wrote:  
 
When a party in a civil case refuses to take the stand to testify as to 
facts peculiarly within his knowledge, the trial court or jury may 
infer that the testimony not produced would have been 
unfavorable. The unfavorable inference applies, however, only 
where it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to 
speak, call witnesses or present evidence.  
 
DiLeo, 88 Md. App. at 69, 592 A.2d at 1131.  Because the events that occurred were 
within the therapist’s “peculiar knowledge,” the instruction was proper.  Similarly:  
 
In a civil case it is well settled that failure of a party to produce an available 
witness who could testify on a material issue, if not explained, gives rise to 
an inference that the testimony would be unfavorable, and is a legitimate 
subject of comment by counsel in argument to the jury.   
 
Hoverter v. Dir. of Patuxent Inst., 231 Md. 608, 609, 188 A.2d 696, 697 (1963) 
(commenting on failure to call a psychiatrist to testify in civil commitment hearing). 
86 DiLeo, 88 Md. App. at 70 n.5, 592 A.2d at 1131 n.5. 
87 As noted in Patterson v. State, “Nonproduction of evidence does not automatically 
equate to destruction of evidence.” Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d 
1119, 1129 (1999) (differentiating Larsen and DiLeo as “cases in which one party 
destroyed potential evidence”). 
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intermittent red traffic light.88  The plaintiff filed a count for fraudulent 
destruction of evidence, alleging that the MM3 was removed after the 
occurrence and the county had been in possession of, and altered, the MM3 
before an expert could examine it.  The court wrote: 
 
The destruction or alteration of evidence by a party gives rise 
to inferences or presumptions unfavorable to the spoliator, the 
nature of the inference being dependent upon the intent or 
motivation of the party. Unexplained and intentional 
destruction of evidence by a litigant gives rise to an inference 
that the evidence would have been unfavorable to his cause, 
but would not in itself amount to substantive proof of a fact 
essential to his opponent's cause . . . .  89 
 
The remedy would have been “appropriate jury instructions as to permissible 
inferences,” and the court held that it was not error to sustain a demurrer to the 
separate count alleging spoliation. 
     Subsequently, in Anderson v. Litzenberg, Litzenberg obtained a verdict for 
damages arising out of a traffic accident. 90  While he was driving behind 
defendant’s truck, a tarpaulin came loose from the truck and struck an 
oncoming vehicle.  The oncoming vehicle lost control and crashed into 
Litzenberg.  At the scene, a state trooper noted a frayed or broken cable that 
had been connected to the tarp.  Thereafter, potential evidence was discarded: 
 
The tarp and cables remained on the truck until an adjuster for 
[defendant and employer of defendant truck driver] Bramble's 
insurer inspected the tarp system. After the inspection, 
Bramble maintenance personnel removed the tarp system and 
discarded its remnants except for a segment of cable that 
[Bramble’s director of truck operations] Mr. Dimaggio had 
cut off. According to Mr. Dimaggio's trial testimony, he 
retained that particular segment of cable because he believed 
that it was the component of the tarp system that had failed. 
At trial, he ultimately conceded under cross-examination that 
he might have anticipated the possibility of a claim arising out 
                                                                                                                             
88 Miller v. Montgomery Cnty., 64 Md. App. 202, 494 A.2d 761 (1985), cert denied, 
304 Md. 299 (1985).  Prior to Miller, in Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., the court 
held that an adverse inference due to a hospital destroying a bench that had 
collapsed, resulting in personal injury would have been “unavailing” because “[a]t 
best, the unfavorable inference here would be that the bench was defective; no 
inference would necessarily arise that the hospital knew of the defect.” Burkowske v. 
Church Hosp. Corp., 50 Md. App. 515, 524, 439 A.2d 40, 45 (1982), cert. denied, 
293 Md. 331, 439 A.2d 40 (1982). 
89 Miller, 64 Md. App. at 214, 494 A.2d at 768. 
90 Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 694 A.2d 150 (1997). 
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of the injuries caused by the tarp system's malfunction. At the 
time that Bramble discarded the remnants of the tarp system, 
however, no claims stemming from the 22 April accident 
were pending.91 
The relevant defendants (now appellants) challenged the jury 
instruction that “destruction of evidence by a person gives rise 
to an inference or presumption unfavorable to spoiler, and, 
secondly, if the intent was to conceal the nature of the defect 
the destruction must be inferred to indicate a weakness in the 
case.” 
 
The Anderson court relied on Miller for the proposition that a jury instruction 
was the proper remedy: 
 
Miller makes clear that two levels of inferences could have 
been drawn from Bramble's discarding most of the tarp 
system. If the jury concluded that Bramble's decision to throw 
away the tarp was merely the product of innocent mistake, the 
jury could still presume that, at the time of the accident, the 
tarp was in a defective, or otherwise unfavorable, condition. 
If, on the other hand, the jury was convinced that Bramble had 
a fraudulent intent to conceal the nature of the tarp's defective 
condition, the jury could also infer Bramble's consciousness 
of the fact that its case was weak. Thus, under Miller, an 
adverse presumption may arise against the spoliator even if 
there is no evidence of fraudulent intent. As such, the judge's 
revised instruction fully comported with our pronouncement 
of Maryland law concerning spoilation [sic] of evidence in 
Miller and was, therefore, an accurate statement of Maryland 
law on this issue.92 
 
Thus, the Anderson court made clear that a showing of bad faith is not a 
prerequisite to an adverse inference against the spoliator: “Simply put, one 
does not ordinarily withhold evidence that is beneficial to one's case. Indeed, 
the converse is equally true: one maintains evidence that one believes will be 
beneficial to one's case.”93 
                                                                                                                             
91 Id. at 558-59, 694 A.2d at 154-55.  The court did not discuss whether litigation 
was reasonably anticipated. 
92 Id. at 561-62, 694 A.2d at 156. 
93 Id. at 562, 694 A.2d at 156; cf. Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 696, 741 A.2d 
1119, 1129 (1999) (“Larsen and DiLeo point to intent or motive behind the 
destruction as essential to the drawing of the inference. Therefore, those cases do not 
aid petitioner because, not only is there no evidence that the police destroyed the 
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     In Klupt v. Krongard, dismissal of a counterclaim was affirmed due to the 
willful destruction of discoverable electronic evidence.94  The spoliator was 
served with a discovery request for electronic records.95  He had secretly tape-
recorded a number of telephone conversations related to the invention at issue 
in the lawsuit, asserting that he was under the mistaken impression that only 
one party needed to consent to recording.96  He then typed memoranda of the 
recordings and “destroyed the recordings after they had been sought in 
discovery.”97  After a number of disputes, “Klupt was forced to admit [in 
deposition] that he had tape-recorded his conversations with the appellees.”98  
He eventually conceded that he destroyed them after the case had been pending 
for six months and after requests for production had been served. 
     The motion for sanctions asserted a course of deceptive conduct: “Klupt 
made surreptitious recordings of telephone conversations from which he made 
memoranda; he intentionally destroyed the tape recordings; he created dummy 
versions from the original memoranda; he withheld both the original and 
dummy memoranda; he falsely affirmed in his deposition that he had produced 
all documents.”99 
     The court commenced its analysis by explaining the broad range of 
sanctions and discretion permitted under Maryland Rule 2-433.100  It then 
wrote: 
                                                                                                                             
jacket, petitioner has not established what the police motive or intent behind 
destroying the jacket would be.”). 
94 Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 198, 728 A.2d 727, 736 (1999); City 
Homes, Inc. v. Hazelwood, 210 Md. App. 615, 700, 63 A.3d 713, 763, cert. denied, 
432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
95 Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 185, 728 A.2d at 730.  
96 Id. at 185-86, 728 A.2d at 730. 
97 Id. at 188, 728 A.2d at 731. 
98 Id. at 189, 728 A.2d at 732. 
99 Id. at 190, 728 A.2d at 732. 
100 Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 194, 728 A.2d at 734.  In addition to the sanctions 
discussed elsewhere in this article, the danger of spoliation may be a basis for 
requesting appointment of a receiver.  Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Estate of Trans 
Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 337, 342, 91 A.3d 1172, 1176, 1179 (2014); cf. 
Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 364, 31 A.3d 529, 570 (2011) (discussing failure to 
demonstrate fraud, spoliation, or imminent danger sufficient to appoint a receiver); 
First Union Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Bottom, 232 Md. 292, 297, 193 A.2d 49, 52 (1963); 
Brown v. Brown, 204 Md. 197, 211, 103 A.2d 856, 863 (1954) (power is to be 
exercised with great caution). See generally Hagerstown Furniture Co. of 
Washington Cnty. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 549, 142 A. 885, 886 (1928); Williams v. 
Messick, 177 Md. 605, 608, 11 A.2d 472, 473 (1940) (on addressing waste by a 
controlling shareholder).  For an opinion in the context of the statute of limitations, 
see Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 499-500, 914 A.2d 735, 753 
(2007) (“In the majority of instances, the time elapsed between the rendition of 
notice and effectuation of a termination is not so long as to foster relevant evidence 




The [Maryland] Rules do not deal explicitly with the 
destruction of discoverable evidence. But they do clearly 
allow for the dismissal of a party's claims for failure to 
respond to a request for production and for failure to obey an 
order compelling such a response or the actual production 
itself. Destruction of evidence such as was found in this case 
would render hollow any response to a request for production, 
even if timely filed, just as it would render an order to compel 
moot. If dismissal is permissible in those cases, it would seem 
to be a fortiori permissible in a case of destruction of 
discoverable evidence.101 
 
The court looked to federal authority and concluded that the Maryland Rules 
also permitted sanctions for such destruction.102 
     The Klupt court found authority in two sources.  First, the court concluded 
“that such an expansive reading of the discovery rules gives trial courts the 
discretion to impose Rule sanctions for the destruction of evidence, a 
discovery abuse not directly covered by the Rules.”103 It then wrote: 
 
Given the importance and novelty in Maryland of the issue of 
sanctions for destruction of discoverable evidence, we will 
not, however, rest our decision solely on this basis. Rather, 
we will also consider the inherent authority of the court to 
regulate the discovery process. When, as here, there is little 
Maryland precedent, we look to cases interpreting analogous 
federal rules.104 
 
The court held that sanctions were supportable under the court’s inherent 
power. 
     The Klupt court rejected the argument that the only sanction available for 
spoliation was an adverse inference.  It held that the broad discretion conferred 
by the discovery rules permitted dismissal as a sanction.  It also noted that:  
                                                                                                                             
falling victim to fading memories, missing documentation, or other spoliation 
concerns.”). 
101 Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 194, 728 A.2d at 734. 
102 Id. at 196-97, 728 A.2d at 735.  For an alternative view of sanctions, see Charles 
S. Fax, “A Modest Proposal: Discard Spoliation Sanctions,” Litigation News, Spring 
2012, Vol. 37, No. 3 (proposing that “the court should dispense with sanctions and 
permit attorneys to offer evidence of spoliation at trial”).  This is apparently what 
happened in Jarrett v. State, infra note 112. 
103 Id. at 195-96, 728 A.2d at 735. 
104 Id. at 196, 728 A.2d at 735; accord Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 175 Md. 
App. 16, 923 A.2d 1032, cert. denied, 401 Md. 174, 931 A.2d 1097 (2007) (civil 
vigilante). 
2015] The Duty to Preserve ESI & the Spoliation Doctrine  
 
149 
[T]he destruction or spoliation of evidence doctrine is itself 
flexible and versatile. . . . Consequently, we see absolutely no 
contradiction in recognizing that destruction of evidence may 
lead to sanctions like dismissal when addressed during 
discovery, while the same offense may raise only an 
evidentiary presumption when dealt with during trial.105 
 
     The Klupt court stated that the discovery rules do not require a showing of 
prejudice to support a default judgment for failure to follow those rules.106  
Instead, the court required “some commensuration between the abusive 
[discovery] conduct and the sanction . . . .”107  Because Klupt had acted 
willfully and contumaciously in destroying discoverable evidence with a 
hammer, that commensuration was present. 
     The interplay between discovery sanctions and inherent power was recently 
addressed in City Homes v. Hazelwood.108 Noting that a court may impose 
sanctions under the Maryland Rules or through its inherent power, the 
Hazelwood court held that a litigant “did not appear to engage in spoliation”; 
however, the litigant failed to disclose “critically relevant and requested 
documents” to his opponent, despite having provided them to his experts.109  
That misconduct “interfered with the goal of the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City, to provide meaningful access to the justice system by the timely, efficient 
and fair processing of all cases,” and it was deemed unprofessional conduct to 
withhold critical documents.110  Because the sanctioned attorney “fail[ed] to 
produce critical documents responsive to discovery requests,” and to disclose 
the finding of the party’s experts, the court reversed the imposition of 
sanctions under the circuit court’s inherent power, and remanded for 
consideration of whether sanctions should be imposed under Maryland Rule 
2-433.111 
     In Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, the court addressed an unusual 
spoliation claim.112  The survivors of a smoker, who was exposed to asbestos, 
                                                                                                                             
105 Klupt. 126 Md. App. at 198, 728 A.2d at 736. The court also rejected the 
contention that dismissal violated the constitutional right to trial by jury. Id. At 199, 
728 A.2d at 736-37. 
106 Id. at 201, 728 A.2d at 738. 
107 Id. 
108 210 Md. App. 615, 669, 63 A.3d 713, 745 (2013), cert. denied, 432 Md. 468, 69 
A.3d 476 (2013). 
109 Id. 
110  Id. at 670, 63 A.3d at 745 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
111 Id. at 670, 63 A.3d at 746.  As to the proper form of a notice appealing the 
imposition of sanctions on an attorney, see City Homes, 210 Md. at 696-99, 63 A.3d 
at 761-63 (2013) (citing Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 382-83, 386, 550 A.2d 959 
(1988)), cert. denied, 432 Md. 468, 69 A.3d 476 (2013)). 
112 Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 764 A.2d 318 (2000).  
Hollingsworth involved disposal of the decedent’s body. Id.  While “unusual,” it is 
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buried the decedent.113  One issue was whether the asbestos exposure was due 
to cigarette filters or, alternatively, occupational asbestos exposure.  The 
defendants asserted spoliation based on the failure to remove and test lung 
tissue prior to burial.  They requested that the body be exhumed, arguing “that 
availability of the lung tissue would have presented [them] with an opportunity 
to analyze the fiber burden of the tissue in order to determine the cause of the 
mesothelioma.”114  In short, they “accuse[d plaintiff] of deliberate spoliation 
of the evidence resulting from the burial of [the deceased] plaintiff’s body 
without the removal and testing of [the deceased] plaintiff’s lung tissue.”115   
     In rejecting the argument, the court concluded that the defendants 
“astoundingly compare the burial of a loved one to the destruction of 
documents.”116  It wrote that plaintiff’s family respected the rights of the 
deceased and “understandingly shrunk back from [defendants’] requests to 
exhume and disfigure the deceased plaintiff’s body.”  It noted that “many 
dollars” were involved in the case.117  “[N]onetheless, we do not place cash 
before conscience.”118 Despite the obvious “evidentiary value” of the body, 
the “deceased’s family properly disposed of the body as would be expected in 
the circumstances.”  Notably, the court emphasized that the defendants had 
waited until after burial and requested exhumation.  The court hinted that a 
similar request to obtain lung tissue prior to the funeral might have been 
granted.119  
                                                                                                                             
not unique. In Jarrett v. State, 220 Md. App. 571, 104 A.3d 972 (2014), a criminal 
defendant unsuccessfully requested a missing evidence instruction because the State 
had permitted release and cremation of the skeletal remains of a murder victim, prior 
to an independent medical examination of them.  The court held that it was not error 
to refuse to give the requested instruction.  Defense counsel had argued that the State 
destroyed important evidence, and the court noted that an adverse inference may be 
drawn by the jury even in the absence of an instruction.  Jarrett, 220 Md. App. at 
580, 593, 104 A.3d at 977, 985 (“Indeed, despite the trial court’s decision not to give 
a missing evidence instruction, the jury was still free to infer that the destroyed 
evidence would have been detrimental to the State’s case.”).  The defendant was 
convicted of murdering his wife and, in a taped conversation with his son, the 
defendant agreed to help pay for the cremation that he now complained was 
prejudicial.  Jarrett, 220 Md. App. at 579-80, 104 A.3d at 977. The court wrote that 
“the State had no affirmative duty to preserve the remains after the autopsy was 
completed.” Id. at 595, 104 A.3d at 986.  The Jarrett court, like the Hollingsworth 
court, stressed that human remains and “the emotional feelings of the living” 
relatives were involved. Jarrett, 220 Md. App. 595, 104 A.3d at 986, n.5; cf. 
Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 137, 764 A.2d at 343. 





118 Id. at 138, 764 A.2d at 343. 
119 The court wrote: 
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     Cecil County Department of Social Services v. Russell, involved allegations 
of sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of determining whether the alleged 
abuser should be entered on the child abuse registry.120  During the abuse 
investigation, an interview with the adult had been recorded.121  It was in the 
possession of law enforcement, but not produced at the hearing.122  Instead, 
the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) offered a sheriff’s report, based in 
part on the recorded interview of the adult, without producing the tape itself.123  
The circuit court remanded in order to have the audiotape made part of the 
record.  Affirming the remand, the court wrote in a footnote: 
 
We have been advised that the disputed audio tape has been 
destroyed. We do not know whether the destruction was 
intentional to avoid disclosure in this case, or whether it was 
done in the ordinary course of business. The better practice 
would be to preserve all potential evidence until all 
proceedings have been concluded.124   
 
     The court wrote that, if the audio recording was not produced on remand, 
there would be a presumption that it was unfavorable to DSS.125  Because the 
                                                                                                                             
 
Appellants were certainly aware of the lethal nature of 
mesothelioma, and could have taken the procedural steps 
necessary, earlier in this action, in order to obtain or preserve the 
evidence they desired without having to ask for exhumation of the 
body.  They elected not to go through discovery procedures to 
request a biopsy or for the preservation of the lung tissue. We find 
it unconscionable that they now denounce appellee’s next of kin 
and counsel for ‘deliberate spoliation of evidence,’ simply because 
they arranged for their loved one’s burial.  
 
Hollingsworth, 136 Md. App. at 138, 764 A.2d at 343. 
120 Cecil Co. Dept. of Soc. Services v. Russell, 159 Md. App. 594, 861 A.2d 92 
(2004). 
121 Id. at 599, 861 A.2d at 95. 
122 Id. at 600, 861 A.2d at 96. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 617, 861 A.2d at 106.   
125 The court explained:  
 
As we read Miller and Anderson, we conclude that, upon remand, 
the administrative law judge must make a factual determination 
regarding the circumstances of destruction of the audio tape.  An 
intentional or willful destruction of the evidence could support a 
presumption unfavorable to the DSS; however, the mere inability 
to produce the audio tape would support an adverse inference 
rather than a presumption. 
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lawsuit turned on “little more than which of two persons is to be believed,” the 
failure to produce the tape was prejudicial.126  Interestingly, the court 
analogized to a criminal case: “Had Russell been charged with crimes as a 
result of the investigation, the State’s Attorney would have been under a duty 
to disclose the audio tape.”127 
     In Spengler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., a trial court’s decision not to instruct 
on spoliation was affirmed.128  The holding was based on the requestor’s 
failure to provide a factual predicate, and failure to show spoliation and 
prejudice.  Only some of the documents that had been requested in discovery 
were produced; however, the jury had returned a verdict for the requestor.129  
On those facts, there was no prejudice shown and the decision not to instruct 
was affirmed. 
     In Keyes v. Hereman, a medical malpractice plaintiff sought a jury 
instruction on spoliation.130  The defendant hospital’s rules and regulations 
mandated preparation of a detailed operative report “as soon as possible.”131  
There was, however, no such report in the plaintiff’s records, nor was there 
any indication of one having been dictated.  Plaintiff claimed that the lack of 
a report hindered her experts.132  The circuit court declined to give an adverse 
inference instruction; however, it permitted plaintiff’s counsel to argue 
spoliation to the jury.133 
                                                                                                                             
 
Id. at 618-19, 861 A.2d at 106-07. 
126 The court reasoned:  
 
[T]he audio tape provides the most accurate, contemporaneous 
record of Russell’s statements to the investigators. If the 
investigators did not rely on the tape to make their reports, it 
would have been the best source for the preparation of accurate 
written reports. Likewise, fairness requires that Russell should 
have the opportunity to use the recording to test the statements and 
conclusions made by the investigators in their reports, and to test 
their credibility and recall, if necessary. During the administrative 
hearing, Russell’s counsel demonstrated instances where 
discrepancies between his testimony and the investigators’ 
statements concerning the interview might easily have been 
resolved.”  
 
Cecil Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 159 Md. App. at 613, 861 A.2d at 103. 
127 Id. at 613, 861 A.2d at 104. 
128 Spengler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 163 Md. App. 220, 878 A.2d 628 (2005). 
129 Id. at 249, 878 A.2d at 645. 
130 Keyes v. Hereman, 191 Md. App. 533, 992 A.2d 519 (2010). 
131 Id. at 536, 992 A.2d at 521. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; see also supra note 102. 
2015] The Duty to Preserve ESI & the Spoliation Doctrine  
 
153 
     In Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., the court held that the 
spoliation doctrine was inapplicable where a store employee discarded a 
perishable item that was on the floor at the time that a customer slipped and 
fell.134 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a legal duty to preserve the 
relevant evidence and that “they cleaned the floor where [plaintiff] fell, while 
she was still lying on the floor.”135  When the defendant moved for summary 
judgment, the plaintiff argued that the motion should be denied because of an 
adverse inference arising from spoliation.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment and the decision was affirmed.136   
     In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court wrote that “[t]here 
may indeed be a ‘business premises slip and fall case’ in which the doctrine of 
spoliation will prevent summary judgment in favor of the business,” however, 
Goin was not that case.  The court reasoned that there was “no evidence” that 
the employee was instructed to “get rid of” such material or acted under a 
policy to retain favorable, and discard unfavorable, evidence.137  It left “to 
another day” whether there would be a different result if there was proof that 
a defendant’s employee was instructed to keep favorable, and discard 
unfavorable, evidence.138  The court wrote that, “[o]bviously, the preservation 
of items which might be relevant evidence in litigation is desirable.”139 
     To similar effect, in another slip and fall case, Maans v. Giant of Maryland, 
LLC, a customer sued a grocery store.140  The customer slipped and fell on 
liquid on the floor.  While on the floor, she heard the assistant store manager 
tell someone who was holding a roll of paper towels “to get up all the water 
off the floor.”141  As in any slip and fall case, plaintiff had to prove notice of 
the unsafe condition.  The store did not keep records of when the area was 
inspected, and plaintiff contended that the store’s failure to maintain records 
made it impossible to prove a negligence case.142  The court rejected that 
argument:  “Under Maryland law, the owner/operator of a store has no duty to 
an invitee to keep records in order to lighten the invitee’s burden of proving 
negligence.”143 
     In accord with the court of appeals, in Dobkin the court of special appeals 
has, in dicta, cited out-of-state authority for the proposition that “spoliation by 
                                                                                                                             
134 Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894 
(2006). 
135 Id. at 615, 890 A.2d at 896. 
136 Id. at 616, 890 A.2d at 897. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at n.2. 
139 Id. at 618, 890 A.2d at 898 
140 Maans v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 161 Md. App. 620, 871 A.2d 627 (2005), cert 
denied, 388 Md. 98, 879 A.2d 39 (2005). 
141 Id. at 624, 871 A.2d at 629. 
142 Id. at 625, 871 A.2d at 630. 
143 Id. at 635, 871 A.2d at 636.  It does not appear that plaintiff argued that the post-
injury clean-up of the water was spoliation. 
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itself did not create a triable issue.”144  Similarly, in Meyer v. McDonnell, the 
intermediate appellate court emphasized that, under Maszczenski and Romeo, 
the inference did not substitute for proof of a fact necessary to the party’s 
case.145 
     In Shpak v. Schertle, however, a witness was permitted to testify that she 
had been threatened if she testified.146  The court held that the testimony was 
admissible, writing that “testimony of spoliation is, in and of itself, substantive 
evidence in support of the other party’s claim.”147  It also approved a jury 
instruction on spoliation: “If you find that a party tried to intimidate or to 
influence witnesses, you may consider the conduct as an indication of 
consciousness by that party that his or her case is weak or unfounded.”148 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
144 Dobkin v. Univ. of Balt. School of Law, 210 Md. App. 580, 608, 63 A.3d 692, 
708-09 (2013) (citing Reeves v. Transp., Inc., 111 Cal. Rept. 3d 896, 909 (2010)). 
145 Meyer v. McDonnell, 40 Md. App. 524, 529-31, 392 A.2d 1129, 1132-33 (1978). 
146 Shpak v. Schertle, 97 Md. App. 207, 629 A.2d 763 (1993), cert. denied, 333 Md. 
201, 634 A.2d 62 (1993). 
147 Id. at 224, 629 A.2d at 772. 
148 The court wrote: “We conclude that the court properly instructed the jury on 
spoliation. The instruction, under Meyer, was an accurate statement of the applicable 
law and was generated by the evidence.”  Id. at 227-28, 629 A.2d at 774 (internal 
citations omitted).  In another tampering case, the court wrote: 
 
[T]he conduct of appellee in attempting to intimidate Doctors 
Nystrom and Pizzi is admissible as tending to show his 
consciousness of the weakness of his case and a belief that his 
defense would not prevail without the aid of such improper and 
unfair tactics as those in which he engaged. This, in conjunction 
with the other evidence in the case, may lead to the further 
inference that appellee considers his case to be weak because he, 
in fact, is guilty of the negligence which appellant asserts he 
committed. Such inferences are, of course, merely permissible and 
the jury is free to either accept or reject them as it sees fit. . . . 
[O]ur holding is that the evidence in question had probative value 
insofar as it related to the appellee’s consciousness of the 
weakness of his case and it could have been considered by the jury 
for that purpose. There was evidence that the operation caused the 
appellant’s complaints. There was also evidence that the 
appellant’s complaints were not true and that in any event they 
were not caused by the operation. We cannot say that the evidence 
of the doctor’s misconduct in attempting to influence witnesses for 
the opposition would not have turned the scales of justice in the 
jury’s mind if they had been properly instructed on the question. 
We therefore reverse. 
   
Meyer, 40 Md. App. at 533-34, 392 A.2d at 1134. 
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VIII. THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF MARYLAND 
 
     While there is no comprehensive source of circuit court ESI spoliation 
opinions, a number of them are available.149  Circuit courts have held that an 
adverse inference may, or may not, defeat summary judgment based on the 
unique facts of the case. 
     In a recent ESI decision involving text messages and mobile devices, any 
inference raised by spoliation was insufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment for misappropriation of trade secrets.  In Maryland Orthotics & 
Prosthetics Co., Inc. v. Metro Prosthetics, Inc.,150 as part of its response to a 
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff asserted spoliation based on deletion 
of text messages and attempting to wipe devices by resetting them, arguing 
“that Defendants Haun and Goller destroyed electronic information that 
provided evidence of their competitive activities.”151  In response, the 
defendants offered evidence that the destruction was not intentional and, 
instead, the data was auto-deleted.152  The court suggested that the deletion and 
resets “may have innocent meanings . . . .” The court found that there was a 
genuine dispute of material fact regarding this allegation; however, because 
the information at issue was not a trade secret, the court held that even if an 
adverse inference was drawn, it would not prevent summary judgment on the 
trade secret claim.153 
     On the other hand, a spoliation issue was one factor that precluded summary 
judgment in Estate of Delores Ethel Stray v. Kinali.154  State Farm’s motion 
for summary judgment, asserting that a driver was not negligent in a fatal 
encounter with a pedestrian, presented issues of negligence and contributory 
negligence.  The driver had left the scene and “tried to dispose of parts of the 
                                                                                                                             
149 Unfortunately, and due to the understandable demand on the resources of the 
circuit courts, many of the available decisions are conclusory.  See, e.g., Wynn v. MJ 
Harbor Hotel, No. N 24-C-08-001376 OT, 2010 WL 4567746 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. 
City Feb. 1, 2010); Jarvis v. Geico Ins. Co., 295923-V, 2009 WL 6652820 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Montgomery Cnty. July 23, 2009); Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 223043-V, 
2004 WL 5752514 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cnty. Aug. 26, 2004); Stanton v. 
Legal Sea Foods, Inc., No. 24-C-03-005914, 2004 WL 5248867 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. 
City April 12, 2004); Shockley v. Chesser, 24-C-01-001037, 2002 WL 34227132 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Oct. 28, 2002). 
150 No. 03-C-12-1648, 2013 WL 8813708 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty., June 6, 2013) 
(Finifter, J.). 
151 Id. at *22. 
152 The court did not discuss whether the duty to preserve had been triggered.  Nor 
did it analyze whether the auto-deletion was protected under the “safe harbor” 
provision of Maryland Rule 2-433(b).  Id. 
153 Id. at *22. 
154 No. 10-9274, 2011 WL 7986596 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. Sept. 12, 2011) (Fader, 
J.). 
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vehicle that hit the Decedent. . . .”155  The “possible admission of spoliation 
evidence,” in combination with other facts, defeated summary judgment.156 
     Circuit courts have been clear in requiring that a party seeking spoliation 
sanctions bears the burden of proving that the information that had to be 
preserved in fact existed.157  In Solesky v. Tracy, the “pit bull” case that reached 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland,158 the circuit court denied a spoliation 
motion against the landlord:  “What the movant attempts to do is to equate the 
absence of records held by the landlord, and the absence of correspondence, 
etc. with a failure to preserve which the movant sees as equating to any intent 
to destroy evidence.”159  The court ruled that “[t]his is not a permissible 
inference under the circumstances” presented by an ill, eighty-nine year-old 
landlord.160  The court wrote: 
 
[T]here is simply no evidence that the Landlord kept prior 
leases which were thrown away or pictures or anything else 
which were discarded in connection with this law case or the 
incident of the [pit bull] attack. Spoliation evidence has to 
have a nexus which is not evident from the information 
presented by the movant in support of the motion.161 
 
     The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion.162  It noted that the landlord’s counsel “explained that, 
                                                                                                                             
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 For a decision discussing the role of presumptions in the context of spoliated ESI, 
see infra note 175. 
158 Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 635-36, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079 (2012), as amended 
on reconsideration, (Aug. 21, 2012). 
159 Solesky v. Tracey, No. 8-3489, 2009 WL 8606518 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cnty. May 
29, 2009) (Fader, J.). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 The intermediate appellate court wrote: 
 
The threshold inquiry is whether there was ‘[a]n act of destruction’ 
of discoverable evidence on the part of the accused party. By 
necessity, this inquiry begins after the movant shows that the 
evidence actually existed in the first place. Here, however, the 
circuit court noted that there was no evidence that relevant 
documents or pictures existed. Because the court was not clearly 
erroneous in finding that the Soleskys’ motion did not support a 
conclusion that unproduced documents having material relevance 
to this case had ever been in existence, the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to sanction Tracey for allegedly 
destroying evidence.   
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if there ever were any further documents, they had been lost.”  The landlord 
had moved into her mother’s home and “the movers had lost many of her 
mother’s things during the move, including her leasing files.”163  Additionally, 
a digital camera broke and was thrown away.  While the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari on the spoliation issue, it did not reach it.164 
     To the same effect, in Davies v. Salisbury State University,165 a university 
did not make a tape or transcript of a hearing, asserting that its due process 
rules prohibited it from doing so.  Plaintiff asserted that the “failure to make a 
record of the proceeding should be comparable in effect to spoliation of 
evidence by the University, i.e. failure to create this evidence should be 
likened to destruction of such evidence if it had existed.”166  The court noted 
that plaintiff cited no authority, and rejected the argument.167 
     Digital recording systems were involved in Ghee v. The Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company.168  Plaintiff contended that the defendant should be 
barred from offering evidence on what would have been shown by missing 
digital recordings, apparently asserting that the lack of the recordings was 
evidence of spoliation.  The defendant asserted that it recycled recorded video 
after six months.169  It proved that between the time plaintiff was discharged 
and the time plaintiff sued, the recording was erased.  The court held: “The 
automatic re-recording on the medium would not appear to rise to the level to 
bar testimonial evidence of what occurred by those who participated, 
irrespective of what the recording may have shown.  Plaintiffs motion is 
therefore denied.”170 
     In Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. Breedlove, there was an 
allegation that an employee had improperly emailed company data to the 
                                                                                                                             
Solesky v. Tracey, 198 Md. App. 292, 309, 17 A.3d 718, 728 (2011) (holding that a 
circuit court judge has great discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions), 
aff’d on other grounds, 427 Md. 627, 50 A.3d 1075 (2012).  Solesky was 
legislatively modified on an issue unrelated to ESI or this article.  Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Art. §3-1901 Code Ann. 
163 Solesky, 198 Md. App. at 301-02, 17 A.3d at 724. 
164 Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 635, 50 A.3d 1075, 1079 (2012). 
165 No. C00-0592, 2002 WL 34148047 (Md. Cir. Ct. Wicomico Cnty. May 31, 2002) 
(Davis, J.). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (holding that some record of the hearing was required). 
168 No. 24-C-09-001313, 2010 WL 2128987 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Apr. 1, 2010).   
169 Id. 
170 Id.  The opinion in Ghee does not provide sufficient information to ascertain 
when the duty to preserve was triggered.  Once triggered, the continuation of a 
policy of overwriting data might become indefensible.  See Md. Rule 2-433(b) 
(protecting only routine, good faith destruction).  If litigation was reasonably 
anticipated by the defendant prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, the holding 
may be questioned. 
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employee’s personal email account.171  The court authorized early, albeit 
limited, discovery because “identifying and segregating the data at issue early 
will prevent any spoliation or corruption of evidence, even of an unintentional 
nature, that may occur through simple continual usage of the home 
computer.”172 
 
IX. SUGGESTION FOR A THREE-STEP ANALYSIS 
 
     A number of Maryland courts have followed the 1997 federal decision in 
White v. Office of Public Defender for the State of Md., when applying the 
spoliation doctrine.173  Under White as applied in the Maryland courts, there 
are four elements for spoliation:  (1) an act of destruction; (2) discoverability 
of the evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; and, (4) occurrence of 
the act at a time after suit has been filed, or, if before, at a time when the filing 
is fairly perceived as imminent.174 
     The cited application of White suggests that there must be an intent to 
destroy evidence.  However, the jury instruction quoted in Cost—and other 
Maryland decisions such as Miller and Anderson—support spoliation 
sanctions for negligent or unintentional destruction of information, the loss of 
which is prejudicial.175 
                                                                                                                             
171 Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. Breedlove, No. 13-C-06-650047, 2006 
WL 2400073 (Md. Cir. Ct. Howard Cnty. April 19, 2006) (Sweeney, J.). 
172 Id. at *3. 
173 Referring to White, the Klupt court wrote that the circuit court “wisely followed a 
recent decision of the U.S. District Court for Maryland, which clearly laid out the 
consensus rules for sanctioning destruction of evidence.”  Klupt v. Krongard, 126 
Md. App. 179, 199, 728 A.2d 727, 737 (1999) (citing White v Office Pub. Defender, 
170 F.R.D. 138, 147-48 (D. Md. 1997)); accord Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. 
Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 137, 764 A.2d 318, 343 (2000); Weaver v. ZeniMax 
Media, Inc., 175 Md. App. 16, 43, 923 A.2d 1032, 1048 (2007); see Homes v. 
Hazlewood, 210 Md. App. 615, 669, 63 A.3d 713, 746 (2013), cert. denied, 432 Md. 
468 (2013) (citing White, 170 F.R.D. 138). 
174 Klupt, 126 Md. App. at 199, 728 A.2d at 737.  After citing those elements, the 
White court wrote:  
 
[A] fifth element is in a sense always required, namely prejudice to the 
opposing party, since sanctions are not as a rule imposed where there has 
been no prejudice to a party. But since the extent of the prejudice bears 
more on the issue of the scope of the sanction to be imposed rather than the 
issue of whether any sanction should be imposed at all, discussion of that 
element may be deferred until the scope issue is addressed. 
 
White, 170 F.R.D. at 147. 
175 “Prejudice” has been given a narrow definition in this context: “Spoliation of 
evidence causes prejudice when, as a result of the spoliation, the party claiming 
spoliation cannot present ‘evidence essential to its underlying claim’.”  Victor 
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     A persuasive body of recent case law suggests that spoliation decisions 
should be made using what is essentially a three-step analysis.  First, was there 
a duty to preserve potentially responsive information?  That question turns on 
(a) whether the duty was triggered, and, if so, (b) an analysis of its scope, and 
(c) proportionality limits to the scope.  Second, if there was a breach of the 
duty, was it accompanied by a sufficiently culpable state of mind?  Finally, 
was the loss prejudicial to the innocent party and, if so, what sanction is 
appropriate?176 
     Two goals of the spoliation doctrine should be to level the playing field and 
deter misconduct.  For example, in Cost, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
suggested that the overriding goal in assessing a spoliation issue should be to 
level the playing field when there is a prejudicial failure to preserve potentially 
responsive information.177  In Hoffman, the court of appeals condemned 
destruction in violation of a regulatory and ethical duty to preserve that 
information, i.e., deterrence.178  Similarly, the wrongdoer in Klupt purposely 
and deceptively destroyed tapes well after a duty to preserve them had arisen—
misconduct that needed to be deterred.179 
     The result in Goin, the grocery store slip-and-fall case, might be different 
under this three-step framework.180  Instead of looking at what instructions 
were, or were not, given to the employee who destroyed the material that led 
to the slip-and-fall, a court might ask if the duty to preserve was triggered by 
the fall, i.e., whether, under an objective standard, litigation was reasonably 
anticipated at the time that the plaintiff was lying injured on the floor.181  If the 
                                                                                                                             
Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 532 (D. Md. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  The Victor Stanley decision discusses the presumptions applicable to a 
determination of prejudice that flow from intentional, as opposed to negligent, acts.  
Id. 
176 Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009); Victor 
Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 520; First Mariner Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV. 
MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014); cf. Harrell v. Pathmark, 
2015 WL 803076, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding no sanctions in slip-and-fall 
case occurring in grocery store where the scene was photographed and video footage 
not preserved), appeal filed, __ F.3d __ (3d Circ. 2015). See generally L. WHARTON 
& S. WEIRICK, “DUTY TO PRESERVE: BEST PRACTICES, SPOLIATION, SANCTIONS, AND 
THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION,” in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1.  
MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: 
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION, 
ch. 1 (Daniel F. Gourash ed., ABA 3d ed. 2013). 
177 Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 10 A.3d 184 (2010). 
178 Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 867 A.2d 276 (2005). 
179 Klupt v. Krongard, 115 Md. App. 549, 694 A.2d 150 (1997). 
180 See Goin v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 166 Md. App. 611, 890 A.2d 894 
(2006). 
181 One court suggested, “Even in a highly litigious community or culture, just 
because a person falls in a grocery store does not mean that litigation is imminent.” 
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duty was triggered, the next question might have been to define its scope, i.e., 
was the destroyed material relevant?  Then, the court could consider 
proportionality, i.e., the cost of preserving it.  If the duty was breached, the 
next question would be whether the destruction was with a culpable state of 
mind and, under Maryland case law, even unintentional destruction may 
support some sanctions.  Finally, a reviewing court would determine whether 
plaintiff had been prejudiced by the destruction.  In short, was there a need to 
level the playing field? 
     Similarly, a different analysis might have led to a different result in 
Maszczenksi v. Myers.182  There, a five-year-old, pupil fell when a swing at a 
private kindergarten broke.  A short time before the event, some links in the 
chain had been replaced.  The defendant testified that the spreader link “had 
no apparent defect and had nothing wrong with it . . . .”183  After the fall, 
however, defendant found, but threw away, the broken link “because he had 
no reason to keep it.”184  Plaintiff’s expert testified regarding spreader links, 
but “[h]e had, of course, never inspected the link in question here, and, of 
course, did not know[] whether it did in fact reopen.”185  Plaintiff complained 
that it lacked the evidence because the defendant had destroyed it.  As noted 
above, the court wrote that there was no evidence that defendant “disposed of 
the link intentionally for the purpose of concealing the fact that it opened,” and 
“[i]t could hardly be contended” that disposal of the link was sufficient to show 
that a pre-accident inspection would have revealed a defect.186 
     Under the three-step approach applied to the same facts, the first question 
would be whether litigation was reasonably anticipated when the swing broke 
and the child was injured, not whether the defendant had a reason to keep the 
broken link.  Assuming that litigation was reasonably anticipated, the duty to 
preserve would be triggered, and the second question would be whether that 
duty was breached by throwing away the broken link.  Clearly the link was 
relevant, and the cost of retaining it would not be disproportionate to the case.  
Those factors could support a conclusion of breach.  If a breach was found, 
the next inquiry would be whether the breach was accompanied by a culpable 
state of mind.  While the court determined that there was no evidence of 
disposal with intent to conceal a fact,187 as noted above, many Maryland cases 
support spoliation sanctions for unintentional acts.  Finally, the question would 
be whether the plaintiff was prejudiced because she could not produce 
evidence due to the defendant’s destruction of the link.  That appears to have 
                                                                                                                             
Harrell v. Pathmark, 2015 WL 803076, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2015), appeal filed, __ 
F.3d __ (3d Cir. 2015). 
182 212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109 (1957). 
183 Id. at 349, 129 A.2d at 110-11. 
184 Id. at 350, 129 A.2d at 111. 
185 Id. at 351, 129 A.2d at 111. 
186 Id. at 355, 129 A.2d at 114. 
187 Id. 
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been the case in light of the expert’s inability to examine the spreader link.  
Thus, application of the three-step analysis may have led to a different result 
in Maszczenksi v. Myers.188 
 
X. CONCLUSION AND CAUTIONARY NOTE 
 
     There are good reasons to approach sanctions decisions with great 
caution.189  They often arise in an unclear context:  “Courts, lawyers, and 
litigants are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, still . . . ‘writing the 
book’ on the use of electronic information in litigation.”190  Nevertheless, a 
few years ago, the Duke Law Journal reported that sanctions were at an “all-
time high.”191  In this evolving context, sanctions may negatively impact 
civility and have the potential to unfairly destroy careers. 
     First, sanctions provide a civil law analog to the criminal Brady192 attack.  
They permit civil litigators to prevail, not on the merits, but by attacking 
opposing counsel.  The potential impact on civility is obvious.193 
                                                                                                                             
188 A different result might also have been reached in Maryland Jockey Club of 
Baltimore City, Inc. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2364, 2002 WL 32123994 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Dec 17, 2002).  There, a defective electrical transformer 
malfunctioned during the Preakness.  The owner and its insurer sued BG&E, which 
had removed and not preserved the parts that had malfunctioned.  In pertinent part, 
the court construed the pleading to assert a separate tort of spoliation and correctly 
rejected that assertion.   
189 In the context of Maryland Rule 1-341, sanctions are an “extraordinary remedy” 
that are reserved “for the rare and exceptional case.”  Art Form Interiors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Homes, Inc., 92 Md. App. 587, 594-95, 609 A.2d 370, 374 (1992).  
“[J]udicial hindsight” is not permitted.  Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Bishop’s Garth 
Associates Ltd. P’ship, 75 Md. App. 214, 222, 540 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988) 
(referring to “judicially guided missiles”); see also Andrew J. Felser, Guiding the 
Guided Missile, The Baltimore Barrister, Fall 1988, at 19 (“One court has called 
these sanctions judicially guided missiles pointed at those who proceed in the courts 
without any colorable right to do so.”). 
190 MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 748. 
191 Dan H. Willoughby et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By The 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010) (“E-discovery sanctions are at an all time 
high.”).  The Willoughby article states that “there has been a significant increase in 
both motions and awards since 2004.” Id. at 790-91.  While “[m]arquee e-discovery 
disaster cases . . . are towering reminders of the most severe sanctions . . .  [o]f 
greater concern to the average practitioner is the increasing frequency of sanction 
decisions.” Id. at 792-93. 
192 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
193 In an earlier blog, the author explained: 
 
Sanctions motions in civil cases have developed a civil procedure 
analog to a Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] attack on 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  In short, under the sanctions 
rules, civil litigators could obtain a tactical advantage by alleging 
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     Second, there is a substantial risk of error, and the impact can be irreparable.  
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., is illustrative.194  In 2008, a United States 
Magistrate Judge “properly incensed” at counsel’s conduct, imposed $8.5 
million in sanctions and referred six attorneys to California Bar Counsel for 
possible disciplinary action.195  That decision received wide publicity.  On 
review, however, the District Judge ruled that the Magistrate Judge had 
erroneously analyzed privilege issues, prejudicing the lawyers, and vacated 
the sanctions decision.   
     A fifteen-month period of discovery followed.196  Seven engineers, four 
attorneys and two paralegals were deposed.  Following a three-day hearing, 
the court determined that the attorneys, although they acted in bad faith, should 
not be sanctioned.  While the court remained critical of the previously-
sanctioned attorneys, the court also described “an incredible lack of candor” 
by their former client in its discussions with them.197 
     By the time the sanctions were lifted, however, the attorneys’ careers and 
personal lives had been devastated.198  Several left their law firm “and never 
landed a job with a new firm.”199  Qualcomm’s general counsel reportedly 
resigned shortly after the initial decision.200  While no one is asserting that the 
attorneys were error-free, the collateral impact of an erroneous imposition of 
sanctions appears disproportionate to the flaws identified under the 
circumstances presented.201 
                                                                                                                             
deficiencies in the performance of opposing counsel.  The 
opposing attorney, countering such allegations, was often tempted 
to respond in kind.  Civility suffered.  
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194 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2008), vacated and remanded in part, 2008 WL 
638108 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), reconsideration denied, 2008 WL 2705161 (S.D. 
Cal. Jul. 7, 2008), appeal dismissed, 327 Fed. Appx. 877, 2008 WL 1336937 (Fed. 
Cir. Aug. 18, 2008), on remand, 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010). 
195 MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 707. 
196 Id. at 718. 
197 Id. at 719. 
198 Id. at 720 n.82. 
199 Id. (quoting Z. Elinson, Lawyers in Discovery Scandal Say Qualcomm Lied, 
Recorder (Nov. 3, 2009)). 
200 MANAGING E-DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 720 n.82. 
201 For an older discussion of cases in which sanctions orders were reversed in 
Maryland, see Brault, supra note 193, at 24-26. 
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     It is suggested that the formula described in cases such as Victor Stanley 
and Praxair202 is a more modern and satisfactory description of when a breach 
of the duty to preserve supports spoliation sanctions.   
                                                                                                                             
202 See Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009); 
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 520 (D. Md. 2010); First 
Mariner Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., CIV. MJG-12-1133, 2014 WL 1652550 
(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2014). See generally WHARTON & WEIRICK, supra note 176. 
 
